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INTRODUCTION
I have been a student of Professor Michael J. Perry for more than four
decades. In the late 1970s, in classes at The Ohio State University College of
Law, I experienced first-hand his extraordinary command of constitutional law
and theory, his precise organization and logic, and his contagious intellectual
enthusiasm. Influenced by his inspirational example, I was moved to become a
constitutional law teacher and scholar myself. As such, I have been and remain
a student of constitutional law and theory, and therefore of Professor Perry. And
I have learned and profited enormously from his tightly reasoned, insightful,
trail-blazing, and provocative work.
*
Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law Emeritus, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Adjunct
Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University Bloomington. Copyright 2022 by Daniel O. Conkle.
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Over the course of his remarkable career, Professor Perry has written
extensively on a variety of topics, and he has been broadly open to critique and
competing perspectives. From one book or article to the next, he has
reconsidered, clarified, and modified his positions and arguments, embracing
and exhibiting a salutary model of scholarly development and maturation. In this
Essay, I will not attempt to survey Perry’s voluminous work or map the various
steps of his decades-long scholarly evolution. Instead, I will focus narrowly on
selected aspects of his work in the area of constitutional law and theory.
More specifically, I will address and evaluate Perry’s approach to the
Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review in individual rights cases—that is,
in cases presenting claims of constitutionally protected individual rights. In fact,
I will consider two different Perry approaches: that of “Early Perry” and that of
“Contemporary Perry.” These two approaches are drawn from what (as of this
writing) can be seen to represent the bookends of Perry’s thinking on the
constitutional rights of individuals and their protection by the Supreme Court:
his very first book, published in 1982,1 and his most recent, published thirty-five
years later, in 2017.2 Early Perry embraced an aggressive form of judicial
activism, urging the Supreme Court to test political judgments through an openended search for political-moral truth.3 Contemporary Perry, by contrast,
advocates an originalist, but highly nuanced, model of judicial review,
contending that there is a global political morality of human rights and that this
global morality should influence the interpretation of American constitutional
law.4 I am critical of Early Perry but find Contemporary Perry’s theory
attractive, albeit with caveats.
In Part I, I will identify three criteria for evaluating competing models of
judicial review in individual rights cases: (1) majoritarian self-government, (2)
judicial objectivity and competence, and (3) functional justification. Using these
criteria, Part II will assess Early Perry. I will argue that Early Perry’s posited
search for political-moral truth provided a compelling functional justification for
his model of judicial review but that, conversely, the model faltered badly under
my remaining criteria—majoritarian self-government, as well as judicial
objectivity and competence. In Part III, at considerably greater length, I will
explore, analyze, and evaluate Contemporary Perry’s complex and subtle
1
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982).
2
MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2017).
3
See infra Part II.A.
4
See infra Part III.A.2.
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arguments. As I will explain, Contemporary Perry’s theory, viewed in the
abstract, satisfies each of my three criteria to a substantial degree. His model of
judicial review would serve a powerful function by bringing American
constitutional law into closer alignment with the political morality of human
rights even while accommodating majoritarian self-government and the need for
judicial objectivity and competence. Moving from an abstract account to a more
fine-grained analysis of Contemporary Perry’s elaborations and applications of
his model, I will add caveats to my positive appraisal, suggesting that the model
might not be as objective as it seems and that, as a result, it might permit the
Supreme Court to exercise discretion in a manner that could significantly
diminish the role of majoritarian self-government. I will end the Essay with
concluding observations. I will summarize my principal points; highlight
Professor Perry’s dramatic transformation from Early Perry to Contemporary
Perry; and identify a possible path for future scholarly inquiry.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CASES: CRITERIA OF
EVALUATION

Writing in 1962, Professor Alexander M. Bickel famously identified the
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”5 As Bickel understood, our representative
democracy rests on the consent of the governed or, more precisely, the consent
of a majority of those governed, making judicial review “a deviant institution in
the American democracy.”6 At a minimum, judicial review is in serious tension
with the principle of majoritarian self-government in individual rights cases—
that is, in cases presenting claims of constitutionally protected individual rights.
Why should the Supreme Court, a body of unelected, life-tenured jurists, be
permitted to nullify majoritarian policies by declaring that they violate
constitutional rights? According to Bickel, the answer is not obvious, and the
practice requires a normative justification.7 “The search must be for a function,”
he concluded, “which might (indeed, must) involve the making of policy, yet
which differs from the legislative and executive functions; which is peculiarly
suited to the capabilities of the courts; [and] which will not likely be performed
elsewhere if the courts do not assume it.”8
Bickel’s insights suggest grounds for evaluating the exercise of judicial
review in individual rights cases. Because the Supreme Court might employ
5
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
POLITICS 16 (1962).
6
Id. at 18; see id. at 16–21.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 24.

AT THE
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various sorts of decisionmaking methodologies, including various forms of
originalism or nonoriginalism, normative theories of judicial review must be
assessed with reference to the particular methodologies that they propose.
Bickel’s observations can be understood to generate three criteria of evaluation,
each of which is a matter of degree.9
The first and most obvious criterion is that of majoritarian selfgovernment.10 Designed to address the counter-majoritarian difficulty, this
criterion asks how or to what extent the Court’s decisionmaking can be
reconciled with the fundamental principle of majoritarian self-government.
Second, there is the criterion of judicial objectivity and competence.11 As
Bickel suggested, the Supreme Court’s role should be well-suited to the judicial
office.12 Courts are not “naked power organ[s].”13 Rather, as Justice Cardozo
insisted, their task is that “of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given
from without.”14 To the fullest extent possible, the Supreme Court’s
decisionmaking should be principled and consistent. It should be based on
objectively determined values, not merely the Justices’ own, and the
determination of these values should be within the judicial ken.
Finally, there is the criterion of functional justification.15 To justify judicial
review, Bickel explained, “[t]he search must be for a function”16 that is
sufficiently compelling to support the practice. Accordingly, this criterion asks
how or to what extent the Court’s individual rights decisionmaking serves an
important function in contemporary American government.
II. EARLY PERRY
A. Early Perry’s Theory of Judicial Review
In his first book, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An
Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary,17
9
I first identified these criteria in the context of substantive due process. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 80–81 (2006). But the criteria readily extend to
individual rights cases more generally.
10
Id. at 80.
11
Id. at 81.
12
BICKEL, supra note 5, at 24.
13
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
14
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921).
15
Conkle, supra note 9, at 81.
16
BICKEL, supra note 5, at 24.
17
PERRY, supra note 1. For an analysis of the book beyond that which is presented here, see Daniel O.
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Professor Perry equated human rights with constitutional rights. “By ‘human
rights,’” Early Perry explained, “I mean simply the rights individuals have, or
ought to have, against government under the ‘fundamental’—constitutional—
law.”18 And he went on to advocate a remarkably broad role for the Supreme
Court in the identification and protection of such rights.
Perry maintained that, properly understood, the text and original meaning of
the Constitution (including its amendments) do not confine, and do little to
inform, the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking in individual rights cases.
Originalism, he explained, simply cannot justify the individual rights that have
been and should be recognized by the Supreme Court.19 Perry rejected
arguments for expanding the original meaning by reading it to embody broad
principles, as opposed to more specific judgments. As originally understood, he
concluded, the Constitution’s power-limiting provisions reflected “plainly
narrow” intentions and “discrete, determinative value judgments about what
particular sorts of political practices government ought to forswear.”20 As a
result, he concluded, “virtually all of [the Supreme Court’s contemporary]
constitutional doctrine regarding human rights” is the product of nonoriginalist
decisionmaking.21
Eschewing originalism in favor of “(a fierce) judicial activism,”22 Early
Perry embraced a decidedly nonoriginalist and extremely expansive approach to
judicial review. In so doing, he defended the Court’s contemporary decisions
and urged it to go further. Judicial review in individual rights cases, he
contended, should be designed to advance an American commitment to “moral
evolution”—a commitment “to bring our collective (political) practice into ever
closer harmony with our evolving, deepening moral understanding.”23 He
envisioned the Supreme Court as a moral prophet whose prophetic voice and
wisdom could and would lead the country toward morally correct answers to
individual rights questions. Judicial review, he wrote, “represents the
institutionalization of prophecy.”24

Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry’s Constitutional Theory
and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 601–24 (1985).
18
PERRY, supra note 1, at 2 n.†.
19
Id. at 91.
20
Id. at 71.
21
Id. at 91. Using then-common academic terminology, Early Perry referred to originalist review as
“interpretive” and nonoriginalist as “noninterpretive.” Id. at 71.
22
Id. at 138.
23
Id. at 99.
24
Id. at 98.
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But how, exactly, were the Justices to perform this function? How were they
to discern the answers that are morally correct? Perry’s answer was bold and
provocative. The Justices would and should rely on their own values:
The problem of how to proceed, when dealing with a difficult human
rights issue, is not different for the justice than it is for the
legislator. . . . [T]he justice, like the legislator, will inevitably
conclude that some particular political-moral principles (perhaps even
a particular political-moral system) are better than others. Inevitably
each justice will deal with human rights problems in terms of the
particular political-moral criteria that are, in that justice’s view,
authoritative.25

Thus, even as he conceded that his position was “radical,” Perry insisted that
“the ultimate source of decisional norms is the judge’s own values”—albeit
values informed and tested, he hoped, by “a very deliberate search for right
answers.”26 In short, according to Early Perry, the Justices should recognize and
protect, as constitutional rights, whatever individual rights they personally
regard as human rights worthy of legal recognition and protection.27
B. Evaluating Early Perry’s Theory of Judicial Review
Considering my criteria of evaluation in reverse order, Early Perry offered a
functional justification for his approach that was profound and powerful. He
posited an American obligation, grounded in “the American people’s
understanding of themselves,”28 to promote moral growth in the world by
providing the right answers to individual rights questions:
The American people still see themselves as a nation standing under
transcendent judgment: They understand . . . that morality is not
arbitrary, that justice cannot be reduced to the sum of the preferences
of the collectivity. They persist in seeing themselves as a beacon to the
world, an American Israel, especially in regard to human rights (“with
liberty and justice for all”).29

To advance the country’s own moral evolution and to fulfill its global role,
America could not rely merely on the will of the people, which is morally
25

Id. at 111.
Id. at 123.
27
In an article published a few years after his book, Perry argued, by analogy to scriptural interpretation,
that the text of the Constitution can be read to support a prophetic understanding of judicial review. See Michael
J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 551, 563–64 (1985).
28
PERRY, supra note 1, at 97.
29
Id. at 98.
26
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fallible. Instead, wrote Perry, “[t]here is a higher criterion in terms of which this
will can be judged; it is possible that the people may be wrong.”30
According to Perry, when legislative and executive officials address
political-moral issues, they are concerned mainly with the desires of their
constituents.31 As a result, they “tend simply to rely on established moral
conventions and to refuse to see in such issues occasions for moral reevaluation
and possible moral growth.”32 By contrast, the Supreme Court, being relatively
detached from majoritarian influences, can and should exercise independent
moral leadership, embracing a prophetic role and testing the popular will through
nothing less than a search for political-moral truth. To be sure, the Court might
not initially provide the right answer to every question, but it could be expected
“to move us in the direction of a right answer.”33 Over time, the practice of
judicial review therefore would permit the Supreme Court to identify and
protect, as constitutional rights, those individual rights that warrant recognition
as human rights—that is, rights the government should respect and honor
because human beings are morally entitled to possess them. In the exercise of
this function, moreover, the Court would be leading not just the country but also
the world. It is difficult to imagine a model of judicial review that could do more
extraordinary good. The Court would be promoting fundamental rights both here
and abroad—rights to which all human beings are properly entitled. Early Perry
readily and powerfully satisfied the criterion of functional justification.
Unfortunately, Early Perry’s theory of judicial review faltered badly under
my other criteria of evaluation. As noted earlier, the criterion of judicial
objectivity and competence asks whether the proposed decisionmaking
methodology is appropriate and fitting for judges.34 As I have explained, Perry’s
open-ended search for political-moral truth is a high and noble calling. But it
hardly qualifies as a judicial calling. However thoughtful and deliberate their
inquiry, the Justices have no particular competence or expertise in the realm of
political-moral reasoning. And for them to rely on their own values as “the
ultimate source of decisional norms”35 would render the Court a non-judicial
body, if not, indeed, “a naked power organ.”36 When the Justices act as judges,
they draw decisional norms from external sources, permitting objective

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 97 (quoting Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1, 4 (1967)).
See id. at 100–01.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 102; cf. id. at 113 (describing “a subtle, dialectical interplay between Court and polity”).
See Conkle, supra note 9, at 81.
PERRY, supra note 1, at 123.
Wechsler, supra note 13, at 19.
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evaluation and critique. By contrast, when they look inside themselves, invoking
their own values in an unguided and indeterminate search for political-moral
truth, an objective assessment is all but impossible.
Two centuries ago, Justice Iredell, responding to the suggestions of “some
speculative jurists,”37 explained why the Supreme Court had no authority to
invalidate laws based merely on the Justices’ own appraisals of “natural justice”:
If . . . the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member
of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their
constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural
justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard:
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all
that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act
which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract
principles of natural justice.38

Early Perry spoke of political-moral truth, not natural justice, but Iredell’s
criticism is equally fitting and equally powerful. In the exercise of judicial
review, the Supreme Court should neither employ a decisionmaking
methodology that is not objective nor adopt a judicial role that the Justices are
not competent to perform. Perry’s model failed on both counts.
Turning finally to the first of my three criteria, it almost goes without saying
that Early Perry’s theory did serious violence to the principle of majoritarian
self-government. Any form of judicial review in individual rights cases is
counter-majoritarian to a degree, but Perry dramatically exacerbated the
problem by endorsing the model of judicial decisionmaking that he did. The
source of governing norms that he identified—the Justices’ own political-moral
values—plainly is not majoritarian. Nor would any significant portion of the
American population, much less a majority, support the judicial role that Perry
envisioned, according to which unelected judges could invalidate the judgments
of elected officials based on an open-ended search for political-moral truth.
Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a less democratic governmental process.
In apparent recognition of this problem, Early Perry attempted to rescue his
theory by contending that Congress, a majoritarian institution, must be accorded
broad power to control the exercise of judicial review. In particular, he took an
37
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in the judgment). Iredell’s reference
seemingly included Justice Chase. See id. at 387–89 (Chase, J., concurring in the judgment).
38
Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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expansive view of Congress’s power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause of Article III.39 On this view, Congress,
if so inclined, could pass a jurisdiction-restricting statute that would effectively
countermand the Court’s recognition of individual rights by precluding it from
deciding future cases in a similar manner. Conversely, and more to the point,
Congress’s failure to enact such legislation should be seen as congressional
acquiescence to the Court’s individual rights decisionmaking, thus providing
silent or covert majoritarian consent or approval. Although this argument is not
without force,40 it suffers from serious weaknesses. First and foremost, there is
simply no evidence that Congress has knowingly acquiesced to the open-ended
and extravagant model of judicial decisionmaking that Early Perry advocated.
Moreover, Congress’s power to control the Court’s jurisdiction in response to
unpopular decisions has been contested constitutionally;41 has been challenged
as unworkable;42 and, despite recurrent proposals, has been discredited and
rejected in the contemporary period as politically inappropriate and misguided.43
As a result, this supposed power no longer provides, if it ever did, anything close
to a clear majoritarian check on the Court. It is, at best, an untested and
problematic mechanism for controlling the contemporary exercise of judicial
review. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that Perry, in a follow-up article,
quietly backed away from his Exceptions Clause argument.44
In summary, Early Perry offered an extraordinarily powerful justification for
judicial review in individual rights cases, but his theory was unpersuasive
because it fared so poorly under the other two criteria of evaluation. He proposed
a decisionmaking methodology that undermined judicial objectivity and that fell
well outside the competence of the Justices. And his model was dramatically at
odds with the fundamental principle of majoritarian self-government.

39
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”); see PERRY, supra
note 1, at 128. Perry argued that Article III gives Congress a similar power to control the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts as well. See id.
40
Cf. Conkle, supra note 17, at 638–64 (embracing a similar but distinctive argument).
41
See PERRY, supra note 1, at 128, 133. Indeed, Perry himself contended that Congress could use its
power over jurisdiction only to countermand nonoriginalist decisions, as opposed to decisions based on “value
judgments constitutionalized by the framers.” Id. at 130. But see Perry, supra note 27, at 580 n.89 (conceding
that, “as a practical matter,” any such power would have to extend to originalist as well as nonoriginalist
decisionmaking).
42
See PERRY, supra note 1, at 130–32, 136–37 n.* (discussing, but disputing, such concerns).
43
See NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31–32 (20th ed. 2019).
44
See Perry, supra note 27, at 580 (“The various mechanisms of political control or influence over the
Court,” Perry wrote, “are adequate even if the Court refuses to concede to Congress the broad jurisdictionlimiting power I discussed in my book.”).
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III. CONTEMPORARY PERRY
A. Contemporary Perry’s Theory
Fast-forwarding through three and a half decades of scholarly maturation,
we encounter a very different Professor Perry—Contemporary Perry—in his
most recent book, A Global Political Morality: Human Rights, Democracy, and
Constitutionalism.45 Unlike Early Perry, Contemporary Perry does not equate
human rights with constitutional rights. Nor does he call for the United States in
general, or the Supreme Court in particular, to be “a beacon to the world” in
promoting individual rights both at home and abroad.46 Instead, Contemporary
Perry moves in the opposite direction, from global human rights to American
constitutional rights. He begins by explaining what he means by human rights
and by the political morality of human rights.47 Contemporary Perry then
describes how the political morality of human rights should influence the
recognition of constitutional rights in the United States.48 As for the Supreme
Court, Early Perry’s call for a “fierce” judicial activism49 has been replaced by
an appeal for judicial deference, as originally proposed by Professor James
Bradley Thayer in his famous 1893 article.50 Despite his invocation of Thayer,
however, Contemporary Perry continues to promote a strong judicial role in the
recognition of constitutional rights—that is, to the extent that they also constitute
human rights.
All of this requires elaboration. In Part III.A.1, I will describe Contemporary
Perry’s understanding of the political morality of human rights and explain why,
in his view, this global morality warrants the support of religious and secular
thinkers alike. Then, in Part III.A.2, I will turn to Contemporary Perry’s theory
of constitutional interpretation and judicial review. As we will see,
Contemporary Perry embraces distinctive versions of originalism and stare
decisis, but he also draws upon the political morality of human rights. His
complex analysis leads to an elaborate framework for judicial decisionmaking,
a framework that instructs the Supreme Court to exercise judicial deference in
certain situations but not in others.

45

PERRY, supra note 2.
See PERRY, supra note 1, at 98.
47
PERRY, supra note 2, at 7.
48
Id. at 9.
49
See id. at 138.
50
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 129, 142 (1893).
46
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1. The Political Morality of Human Rights
Contemporary Perry concedes that the international law of human rights has
limited efficacy.51 Even so, he argues, there is a political morality of human
rights, grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)52 and
other international agreements that have garnered the support of an
overwhelming majority of nations, including in most respects the United
States.53 These international agreements define particular human rights, but,
according to Perry, all such rights derive from and are specifications of what the
UDHR proclaims in its very first article: “All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”54 To Perry, the critical
provision is the final phrase, declaring that all of us, as individuals and
collectively, should honor what Perry calls “the imperative to ‘act towards all
human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.’”55 The political morality of human
rights—precisely because it is a political morality—addresses collective action
in the form of governmental action. It maintains that governments should honor
the brotherhood imperative.56 In other words, governments should recognize and
respect the most basic of all human rights: the right of each and every human
being, without exception, to be treated in a spirit of brotherhood.57 To fully honor
the brotherhood imperative, governments likewise should recognize and respect
other, more specific human rights—that is, “the various rights recognized by the
vast majority of the countries of the world as human rights—as specifications of
what the imperative forbids or requires.”58 In short, the political morality of
human rights includes the brotherhood imperative and the various human rights
that this imperative generates and supports.
Why should any of us, much less the Supreme Court, embrace and promote
the political morality of human rights? Contemporary Perry outlines a dignitybased justification, according to which every human being has equal inherent

51

PERRY, supra note 2, at 2–3.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
53
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 3–4.
54
UDHR, supra note 52, art. 1.
55
PERRY, supra note 2, at 18. As Perry observes, “‘brotherhood’ has a masculine resonance” in today’s
linguistic environment, but the term should be understood, as it was when the UDHR was adopted, to encompass
all human beings, whatever their gender. See id. at 25 n.7.
56
See id. at 25–26.
57
As Perry explains, not all human rights extend to every human being; some are reserved for particular
groups, such as women, children, or the disabled. But the brotherhood imperative extends to all. See id. at 15–
19.
58
Id. at 26.
52
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dignity and is, therefore, inviolable—not to be “violated” by treatment that fails
to honor the brotherhood imperative.59 As Perry explains, however, this dignitybased justification depends upon underlying assumptions about the nature and
moral worth of human beings.60 As a result, the justification is more persuasive
to some than to others. In particular, it is more persuasive to many religious
believers than it is to secular thinkers.61 The justification can readily be
supported, for example, by theists who believe that every human being, without
exception, is born in the image of God and is a beloved child of God, who, as
such, should be treated as sacred.62 A purely secular thinker, by contrast, cannot
easily accept the extension of equal inherent dignity to those, such as infants and
mentally disabled adults, who do not possess the distinctively human
capacities—for reason, self-reflection, and the like—that tend to distinguish the
human race from non-human animal species.63 As a matter of purely secular
logic, Perry concludes, it may not be possible to defend the political morality of
human rights.64
Even if secular arguments fall short, many secular thinkers nonetheless
embrace the brotherhood imperative and therefore embrace the political morality
of human rights. They do so, Perry suggests, based simply on an “agapic
sensibility”65 that generates a commitment to love in the sense of agape (as
opposed to eros or philia). Their abiding love for other human beings springs
not from religious or philosophical justification but from personal experience,
perhaps informed by the observation of moral exemplars, such as the Dalai
Lama, “who embody the sensibility . . . [in] their deep, transformative humanity
and peace.”66 According to Perry, it is this basic human sensibility, however
derived, that provides “the deepest nontheistic explanation” for acceptance of
the brotherhood imperative, and it might provide the deepest motivation “even
for many theists.”67 As a result, he suggests, “[t]he language of love provides
strong . . . [and] perhaps . . . indispensable support for the morality of human
rights.”68

59
See id. at 27–29. Perry separates the argument into two claims: the dignity claim and the inviolability
claim. Id. In the discussion that follows, I am simplifying Perry’s account by treating the two claims together.
60
Id. at 30, 32.
61
See id. at 29.
62
See id. at 30, 32.
63
Id. at 30–33.
64
See id.
65
Id. at 38.
66
Id. (italicization omitted); see id. at 35–41.
67
Id. at 40.
68
Id. at 41.
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The political morality of human rights is further supported, writes Perry, by
the international consensus that it represents.69 In the aftermath of World War
II, the United Nations proclaimed the UDHR,70 and, since then, it has adopted a
series of more specific human rights treaties.71 All of these treaties have garnered
overwhelming support from the United Nations’ 193 member states. For
example, eighty-seven percent of them, or 168 countries, including the United
States, are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).72 To be sure, the governments of many countries “do little more than
pay lip service to their obligations under the treaties,”73 but “the political
morality of human rights has become so compelling to so many . . . that even
among countries that do not take human rights seriously, an ever-diminishing
number is willing to be seen as rejecting the political morality of human
rights.”74 And the very fact that the principles embodied in human rights treaties
are broadly accepted, at least as a matter of professed political-moral judgment,
adds normative weight to the principles themselves, representing as they do a
global political morality—indeed, “the first truly global political morality in
human history.”75 Perry draws the following conclusion:
[T]he norms that constitute the political morality of human rights . . .
serve, among the peoples of the world, as fundamental grounds of
political-moral judgment, grounds that derive their strength from being
formally inscribed in the international human rights treaties to which
most countries of the world—the vast majority of them—are parties.76

Contemporary Perry goes on to discuss a number of important human rights,
as articulated in the UDHR and the ICCPR, explaining how and why they
constitute specifications of the brotherhood imperative. Perry explains his
understanding of these rights and provides his own descriptive labels. Notably,
he argues that the political morality of human rights requires a commitment to
democracy, including, in particular, what he calls the human right to democratic
governance.77 The human right to democratic governance is a compelling
specification of the brotherhood imperative, he argues, because the brotherhood
69

Id. at 3.
UDHR, supra note 52.
71
See, e.g., infra note 72.
72
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; PERRY, supra note 2, at 3–4, 27 (highlighting broad support for ICCPR and other relevant
treaties).
73
PERRY, supra note 2, at 3.
74
Id. at 4.
75
Id. at 27; see id. at 4–5.
76
Id. at 5; see id. at 63–64.
77
See id. at 48–52.
70
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imperative demands, as a general proposition, that people be empowered to
determine for themselves the laws and policies that govern them.78 As a practical
matter, this means some form of representative, majoritarian self-government,
informed by free and fair elections, and the UDHR and ICCPR include
provisions to this effect.79
At the same time, the brotherhood imperative also supports the recognition
of competing human rights—rights that limit the operation of majoritarian selfgovernment. Three are especially noteworthy. The first, a right that Perry calls
the human right to intellectual freedom, is closely connected to the human right
to democratic governance.80 As recognized in the UDHR and elaborated in the
ICCPR, the human right to intellectual freedom protects “freedom of opinion
and expression,” including related acts of assembly and association.81 As Perry
explains, this human right is critical to democratic governance, including full
and informed participation in the majoritarian system.82 Second, there is what
Perry calls the human right to moral equality—the right to be treated as the moral
equal of every other human being.83 This right is protected by the UDHR and
the ICCPR, both as a general proposition and in more specific provisions listing
common types of impermissible discrimination.84 According to Perry, the
human right to moral equality is a virtual restatement of the brotherhood
imperative: treating every human being in a spirit of brotherhood demands that
every human being be treated as morally equal, not morally inferior, to any other
human being.85 Third, in Perry’s terminology, there is the human right to
religious and moral freedom.86 This right, too, is supported by relevant
provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR, provisions that conspicuously protect not
only religious freedom but also freedom of “conscience” and “belief.”87
Accordingly, writes Perry, everyone has “the freedom to live one’s life in accord
with one’s religious and/or moral convictions and commitments.”88 As Perry
explains, the brotherhood imperative supports this right because the imperative

78

See id. at 50–51.
UDHR, supra note 52, art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 25; see PERRY, supra note 2, at 48.
80
PERRY, supra note 2, at 47.
81
UDHR, supra note 52, arts. 19, 20(1); ICCPR, supra note 72, arts. 19, 21, 22; see PERRY, supra note
2, at 52–53.
82
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 53–55.
83
Id. at 47.
84
UDHR, supra note 52, arts. 1, 2; ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 26; see PERRY, supra note 2, at 55–56.
85
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 56.
86
Id. at 63.
87
UDHR, supra note 52, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 18; see PERRY, supra note 2, at 64–67, 65
n.4.
88
PERRY, supra note 2, at 64.
79
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requires government to respect a person’s self-identity and moral integrity by
permitting the person to live out “core or meaning-giving beliefs and
commitments,”89 whether or not religious in nature.90 Perry devotes considerable
attention to moral equality and religious and moral freedom, which play a central
role in his understanding of the political morality of human rights.91
2. Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Review
Moving from global human rights to American constitutional law,
Contemporary Perry constructs a novel theory of constitutional interpretation
and judicial review.92 Gone is the expansive nonoriginalism of Early Perry.
Instead, Contemporary Perry embraces a particular form of originalism and a
distinctive version of stare decisis. At the same time, he draws upon the political
morality of human rights, arguing that it should influence, but not replace,
domestic constitutional law.93 In so doing, he develops an elaborate schema of
judicial presumptions, explaining when the Supreme Court should exercise
judicial deference and when it should not.94
As his starting point, Contemporary Perry adopts a modest and tightly
constrained approach to constitutional interpretation. As a matter of American
constitutional law, he writes, there are only two sources of constitutional
meaning.95 Thus, a constitutional right or other constitutional norm should be
recognized only if it is supported by originalism or, in the alternative, by such
deep and longstanding precedent and societal acceptance that it has become a
bedrock constitutional principle.96 According to the first, originalist alternative,
“N is a constitutional norm if constitutional enactors made N a constitutional
norm”97—that is, if the norm was entrenched in the Constitution by “the human

89
Id. at 68 (quoting JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE 12–13 (2011)).
90
See id. at 71–74. Perry notes that the human right to intellectual freedom is an indispensable component
of the human right to religious and moral freedom because it permits individuals “to deliberate about various
possible religious and/or moral convictions and commitments.” Id. at 54, 87.
91
See id. at 55–87. Perry argues that three human rights constitute “pillars of democracy”: “the human
rights to democratic governance, intellectual freedom, and moral equality.” Id. at 45; see id. at 45–62. The first
two are readily characterized as such. Conversely, it is not clear why the human right to moral equality is
accorded “pillar of democracy” status, especially when the human right to religious and moral freedom is not.
In any event, the “pillar” characterization, as such, seems inconsequential to Perry’s theory.
92
Id. at 112–13.
93
Id.
94
See id. at 95–118.
95
Id. at 108–09.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 108.
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beings whose approval gave the [original] Constitution [or any amendment] the
force of law.”98 According to the second, bedrock alternative, “N is a
constitutional norm if N is constitutional bedrock.”99 Perry explains what it takes
for a norm to qualify:
N has become, in the words of Robert Bork, “so embedded in the life
of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private
and public expectations of individuals and institutions,” that [the
Supreme Court] should and almost certainly will continue to deem N
constitutionally authoritative even if it is open to serious question
whether enactors ever entrenched N in the Constitution. As Michael
McConnell has put the point: “[M]any decisions, even some that were
questionable or controversial when rendered, have become part of the
fabric of American life; it is inconceivable that they would now be
overruled . . . . This overwhelming public acceptance constitutes a
mode of popular ratification.”100

A far cry from Early Perry’s embrace of moral evolution and a prophetic
approach to constitutional interpretation,101 Contemporary Perry’s interpretive
model is entirely backward-looking. It calls not for the development of new
constitutional norms but for the enforcement of old ones, drawn from the
enactors or from bedrock precedent.102
Contemporary Perry’s starting point is only that—a starting point for
constitutional interpretation. As already noted, the United States, through the
UDHR, the ICCPR, and other international agreements, has committed itself to
the political morality of human rights.103 According to Perry, that commitment
should inform the practice of judicial review.104 And so Perry offers a theory of
judicial review “that the Supreme Court of the United States, pursuant to the
morality of human rights, should follow.”105

98
Id. at 109 (quoting Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 709 n.28 (2009)).
99
Id.
100
Id. (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158
(1989)); see Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2417 (2006).
101
See PERRY, supra note 1, at 98–99.
102
In a follow-up article published after his book, Contemporary Perry suggests a third possible source of
constitutional norms, also backward-looking (and implicitly originalist): “the structure of government
established by the Constitution.” Michael J. Perry, Two Constitutional Rights, Two Constitutional Controversies,
52 CONN. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2021).
103
See supra Part III.A.1.
104
See supra Part III.A.1.
105
PERRY, supra note 2, at 92.
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As discussed earlier, a critical component of the political morality of human
rights is the human right to democratic governance.106 And that right, according
to Perry, “should be understood to entail a presumptive right of a majority to
prevail over a minority, such that any departure from majority rule requires a
strong justification.”107 This presumptive favoring of majority rule, he explains,
stands in serious tension with the authority of the Supreme Court to render
ultimate (and not merely penultimate) judgments protecting constitutional
rights,108 judgments that cannot be countermanded politically except through the
exceedingly difficult, supermajoritarian process of constitutional amendment.109
To mitigate this tension, Perry advocates Thayerian judicial deference, modeled
on James Bradley Thayer’s classic argument.110 Echoing Thayer, Perry contends
that the Supreme Court “should generally proceed as deferentially as possible in
adjudicating constitutional claims.”111 In other words, it generally should defer
to the lawmakers in question, who have at least implicitly concluded that their
law is constitutional.112 As Thayer explained, “much which will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to
another.”113 According to Thayer and now Perry, the Supreme Court should
accept the lawmakers’ judgment of constitutionality—their judgment, even if
merely implicit, that the challenged law is not unconstitutional—as long as that
judgment is reasonable. Moreover, “the lawmakers’ judgment is reasonable . . .
if rational, well informed, and thoughtful persons could affirm the judgment.”114
In the language of Thayer, the Court “can only disregard [a challenged law]
when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake,
but have made a very clear one, . . . so clear that it is not open to rational
question.”115
The political morality of human rights generates what Contemporary Perry
calls his “General Principle” of Thayerian deference.116 Notably, however, it
106

Id. at 48–52.
Id. at 99.
108
See id. at 96–98 (discussing America’s “strong-form” judicial review and contrasting it with “weakform” judicial review, according to which judicial rulings of constitutional invalidity either are merely advisory
or else can be overridden by ordinary legislation); id. at 96 n.4 (citing Mark Tushnet, The Rise of Weak-Form
Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321, 321 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds.,
2011)).
109
See id. at 100–03.
110
PERRY, supra note 2, at 103–08; see Thayer, supra note 50, at 152.
111
PERRY, supra note 2, at 108.
112
See id. at 104–05.
113
Thayer, supra note 50, at 144; see PERRY, supra note 2, at 104.
114
PERRY, supra note 2, at 105.
115
Thayer, supra note 50, at 144; see PERRY, supra note 2, at 106 n.29.
116
PERRY, supra note 2, at 111.
107
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also generates what he labels “the Exception”117—and it is a significant
exception indeed. In Perry’s view, the Supreme Court’s consideration of
constitutional claims should be informed by the political morality of human
rights generally, including not only the human right to democratic governance
but other, competing human rights as well—rights that can override the
presumption favoring majority rule.118 Therefore, when the claimed
constitutional right is a human right that limits majority rule, Thayerian
deference should give way.119 The “very same rationale,” explains Perry,
extends to both the General Principle and the Exception: the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Constitution should be designed to “bring the
constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the morality
of human rights.”120 What emerges is an elaborate framework of judicial review,
with deference governing some constitutional questions but not others.
Under Perry’s General Principle, the Supreme Court should reject a
constitutional claim “if there is room for a reasonable difference in judgments
either about whether the norm at issue—the norm that the government action is
claimed to violate—truly is a constitutional norm or about whether the
challenged government action truly violates the norm.”121 The latter point
addresses the application of a posited norm, including a posited constitutional
right, stating that the Court should not find a constitutional violation if
lawmakers could reasonably conclude that their law does not violate the norm.
The former question is more complicated. It implicates the substance of
constitutional norms, including constitutional rights; that is, it implicates the
meaning of the Constitution and therefore Perry’s understanding of
constitutional interpretation. More specifically, Thayerian deference adds an
additional layer of analysis to what I earlier described as Perry’s interpretive
starting point, which recognizes two, and only two, sources of constitutional
meaning. This additional layer makes Perry’s approach to judicial review even
more constrained than his starting point would suggest. Thus, the Supreme
Court, taking a deferential stance, should recognize a claimed constitutional
norm, despite lawmakers’ implicit judgment that no such norm exists, only if the
Court finds (1) that the norm not only is required by originalism but also is so
clearly required that it would be unreasonable to conclude otherwise, or (2) that
the norm not only is a matter of constitutional bedrock but also is so clearly a

117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 111–12.
Id.
Id. at 108.
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matter of constitutional bedrock that it would be unreasonable to conclude
otherwise. Conversely, the Court should reject a claimed constitutional norm,
including a claimed constitutional right, if it would be at least reasonable for
lawmakers to reject both the originalist and the bedrock arguments.122
Under the Exception, by contrast, the Supreme Court should not defer to
lawmakers. Much to the contrary, if “a right that is part of the morality of human
rights is claimed to have constitutional status, [the Court] should rule that the
right has such status if the judgment is reasonable that one of the two [alternative
grounds of constitutional interpretation]—at least one—is satisfied.”123
Accordingly, before turning to constitutional interpretation as such, the Court
must first decide, as a matter of independent judgment (with Thayerian
deference playing no role), whether the claimed constitutional right is a human
right according to the political morality of human rights. And if the Court
concludes that it is such a human right, the Court then should decide that the
human right is also a constitutional right as long as it would be reasonable to
conclude either that the right is supported by originalism or that the right is
constitutional bedrock. In other words, once the Court reaches the issue of
constitutional interpretation, it not only should forego Thayerian deference but
also, in effect, should reverse the Thayerian presumption disfavoring the judicial
recognition of constitutional rights. Thus, the Court need not be satisfied, as a
matter of its own best judgment, that a claimed constitutional right is indeed
supported by originalism or constitutional bedrock. Instead, it should recognize
a constitutional right if it would be reasonable to accept one (or both) of these
alternative arguments. With respect to originalism, for instance, if there are two
competing views, both reasonable, about what the enactors meant by a
constitutional provision, the Court should accept the view that permits the Court
to recognize a constitutional right.124 Although Perry’s constrained, twofold
starting point of constitutional interpretation does not disappear from view, this
dramatic shift in the analysis makes the Supreme Court far more likely to
recognize a constitutional right.
As the final component of his multi-faceted approach to judicial review,
Perry maintains that judicial deference continues to play a role even within the
context of the Exception—that is, even when, in reliance on the Exception, the
Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional norm in the form of a constitutional

122
123
124

See id. at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
See id. at 116.
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right.125 In particular, he argues that the Court should still exercise Thayerian
deference in applying the constitutional norm that it has recognized.
Accordingly, it should not find a constitutional violation if lawmakers could
reasonably conclude that their law does not violate the norm.126
Contemporary Perry offers the following threefold summary, explaining his
position concerning the role of judicial deference in the exercise of judicial
review:
(1) With respect to the question whether the norm at issue is truly a
constitutional norm—whether the norm truly has constitutional status—
Thayerian deference is appropriate,
(2) unless the norm at issue is a right that is part of the morality of human
rights, in which case Thayerian deference is not appropriate.
(3) With respect to the question whether the challenged government action
violates a constitutional norm, Thayerian deference is appropriate, and it is
appropriate even if the norm is a right that is part of the morality of human
rights.127
In reality, as I have explained, Perry’s second point goes beyond a rejection of
Thayerian deference. Instead, when the Exception applies, the Supreme Court is
to accept a constitutional claim even if it does not find the claim persuasive in
its own best judgment; it is enough that the claim is reasonable as a matter of
originalism or constitutional bedrock. As a result, the Exception calls for
“deference of a different sort, deference in a different direction . . . —deference
to the right—if the right at issue is part of the morality of human rights.”128
Perry discusses the implications of his theory for various constitutional
issues, in part through a series of hypothetical judicial opinions.129 He concludes,
for example, that neither the Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual right
to gun possession under the Second Amendment nor its imposition of strict
constitutional limits on race-based affirmative action is supported by a right that
is part of the political morality of human rights.130 The Court therefore should
have applied the General Principle, leading it to Thayerian deference, and it
should have rejected these constitutional claims because it is at least reasonable
125

Id. at 112.
See id. at 112–13.
127
Id. at 116.
128
Id. at 117.
129
The hypothetical opinions are designed to reflect and illustrate Perry’s own position. See id. at 119–20.
Accordingly, I include them in my account and evaluation of his theory.
130
See id. at 114; id. at 135 (hypothetical judicial opinion).
126
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to conclude that the claims are supported neither by originalism nor by
constitutional bedrock.131 Conversely, Perry argues that his theory supports the
Supreme Court’s recognition of an Eighth Amendment right to be free from
excessive punishments that have become uncommon over time, even if the
punishments are not “contrary to long usage.”132 Perry also argues that his theory
supports the Court’s recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage
grounded in “the right of privacy.”133 Each of these rights, he asserts, is part of
the political morality of human rights, which includes the human right to be free
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishments as well as the human right to
religious and moral freedom.134 These claims therefore are properly governed
by the Exception, which calls for “deference to the right.”135 Under this judicial
presumption, each right warrants constitutional recognition—the Eighth
Amendment right because it is supported by a reasonable originalist argument136
and the right to same-sex marriage because it is reasonable to accord bedrock
status to the broader right of privacy on which it rests.137
B. Evaluating Contemporary Perry’s Theory of Judicial Review
Recall my three criteria for evaluating theoretical models of judicial review
in individual rights cases.138 First, can judicial review in accordance with the
model be reconciled with the fundamental value of majoritarian selfgovernment? Second, does the model satisfy the need for judicial objectivity and
competence? Third, does judicial review in conformity with the model serve a
function that is sufficiently compelling to support the practice? As explained
earlier, these criteria are matters of degree. A model of judicial review, in other
words, might be more or less compatible with majoritarian self-government,
more or less compliant with the need for judicial objectivity and competence,
and more or less compelling in the function that it serves. Under these three
criteria, Contemporary Perry’s theory of judicial review is attractive indeed, at

131

See id. at 113–15; id. at 132–37 (hypothetical judicial opinion).
See id. at 115–16. So understood, Perry continues, the Eighth Amendment is properly read to impose
significant restrictions on capital punishment. See id.; see also id. at 120–32 (hypothetical judicial opinion
suggesting that Perry’s theory could go further, rendering capital punishment categorically unconstitutional).
133
See id. at 142–52 (hypothetical judicial opinion).
134
Id. at 63–64, 115–16.
135
Id. at 117.
136
See id. at 115–16.
137
See id. at 142 (hypothetical judicial opinion); id. at 152 (commentary on hypothetical judicial opinion).
Perry also applies his theory to physician-assisted suicide and abortion. See id. at 153–64 (hypothetical judicial
opinions). He offers distinctive observations concerning welfare rights as human rights, urging
constitutionalization but not necessarily judicial enforcement. See id. at 165–84.
138
See supra Part I.
132
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least in the abstract—certainly as compared to the theory of Early Perry.
Conversely, moving from an abstract description and appraisal of Contemporary
Perry’s theory to a more detailed and fine-grained analysis uncovers weaknesses
that might not otherwise be apparent. In the following three sections of this Part
III.B, I first will address Contemporary Perry’s theory in the abstract, offering
an evaluation that is straightforward and highly favorable. I then will explore, at
some length, the complications that arise from a more detailed evaluation of his
theory as elaborated and applied in particular settings. Finally, I will offer my
overall assessment.
1. Contemporary Perry’s Theory in the Abstract
When his theory is considered in the abstract, Contemporary Perry, unlike
Early Perry, fares well under my first criterion of evaluation. He gives serious
weight to the value of majoritarian self-government through his call for
Thayerian deference—both in the recognition of constitutional norms when his
General Principle is in play and in the application of any constitutional norm that
the Supreme Court might recognize, even under the Exception.139 To be sure,
Thayerian deference gives way, and indeed is reversed, when the Court is asked
to recognize a constitutional right pursuant to the Exception.140 Even so, Perry’s
theory, on balance, honors majoritarian self-government to a substantial degree.
Second, while Early Perry urged reliance on the Justices’ personal values,141
Contemporary Perry advocates decisionmaking based on externally derived
norms—norms drawn from originalism, bedrock precedent, and internationally
recognized standards of political morality.142 Discerning these norms is no easy
feat, of course, but the tasks are hardly foreign to judges, who often ascertain the
original intention of legal provisions, assess the weight and depth of judicial
precedent, and determine the meaning of international agreements.
Contemporary Perry’s theory thus satisfies, to a substantial degree, the need for
judicial objectivity and competence.
Third, Contemporary Perry provides a strong functional justification for
judicial review. By adhering to his model, including the Exception, the Supreme
Court would be advancing the political morality of human rights by bringing
American constitutional law into closer alignment with that political morality.143
139
140
141
142
143

See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–105, 127–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
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Early Perry went further, urging the Court to promote moral growth in the world
by providing the right answers to human rights questions, not merely answers
consistent with an established global framework of rights.144 According to Early
Perry, the Supreme Court should be leading the world in a search for politicalmoral truth.145 Contemporary Perry, by contrast, is asking the Court to follow,
not lead, by recognizing global human rights as American constitutional
rights.146 And he asks the Court to act in this manner only to the extent that it
can reasonably do so as a matter of American constitutional law.147
Contemporary Perry’s nuanced theory steps back substantially from Early
Perry’s open-ended pursuit of political-moral truth. In that respect,
Contemporary Perry’s functional justification for judicial review may be less
powerful. But the justification nonetheless is forceful, especially because it also
accommodates majoritarian self-government and the need for judicial
objectivity and competence.
2. Contemporary Perry’s Theory as Elaborated and Applied
To reiterate, under my criteria, Contemporary Perry’s theory of judicial
review is quite attractive, at least in the abstract. But Perry’s elaborations and
examples go beyond an abstract account. We therefore can evaluate his theory
not only in the abstract but also as applied in particular settings. Unpacking
Perry’s theory in this manner exposes some cracks in the theory, cracks that
might jeopardize the theory’s standing under the criteria I have articulated. In
particular, the theory as applied might be less successful in satisfying my
criterion of judicial objectivity and competence and, therefore, my criterion of
majoritarian self-government as well.
Consider, for instance, Perry’s discussion of the human right to moral
equality and its relationship to the constitutional right to equal protection. As
noted earlier, the human right to moral equality is “the right . . . to be treated as
the moral equal of every other human being,”148 a right that precludes
discrimination based on morally irrelevant characteristics such as race.149 But
Perry goes further in elaborating this right, arguing that it bars not only
intentional discrimination but also unintentional mistreatment based on “a
sensibility such as ‘racially selective sympathy and indifference,’ namely, ‘the
144
145
146
147
148
149

See supra notes 28–30, 32–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–30, 32–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
PERRY, supra note 2, at 108–09; see supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
PERRY, supra note 2, at 56.
Id.
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unconscious failure to extend to a [racial] minority . . . the same sympathy and
care [that are accorded to others].’”150 This elaboration is not implausible, but it
is not grounded in the text of the international agreements upon which Perry
relies, nor does he offer any evidence of an international consensus. Instead, the
elaboration rests on a plausible, but expansive and therefore contentious,
understanding of the brotherhood imperative.151 And Perry then relies on this
contentious understanding in urging further, as a matter of constitutional law,
that the Supreme Court should adopt a disparate impact approach to equal
protection, rejecting longstanding doctrine to the contrary152 by no longer
requiring proof of intentional discrimination in every case.153
Under Perry’s General Principle of judicial review, however, the Supreme
Court should exercise Thayerian deference in addressing a claimed
constitutional right154—here, an alleged right to be free from disparate impact—
if the claimed constitutional right is not part of the political morality of human
rights. The General Principle is avoided, and the Exception is triggered, only if
the Court—as a matter of independent judicial judgment—accepts Perry’s
contentious interpretation of the human right to moral equality.155 And even
under the Exception, the Court should nonetheless reject the constitutional claim
unless the claim can reasonably be supported as a matter of originalism or
constitutional bedrock.156 The disparate impact approach has never been adopted
by the Supreme Court,157 so the bedrock alternative is plainly untenable.
Moreover, it seems equally difficult to maintain that any set of constitutional
enactors embraced the disparate-impact understanding of equal protection. In
short, neither alternative seems reasonable. If, as Perry claims, the Supreme
Court should recognize a constitutional right to be free from disparate impact,
then his theory of judicial review, as implemented, may permit a far more
creative and aggressive judicial role than his abstract theory would suggest—
first in articulating the scope and nature of the underlying human right and then
in applying the General Principle or the Exception to the constitutional claim.

150
PERRY, supra note 2, at 56–57 (quoting Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1976)).
151
Id.
152
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977).
153
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 61–62.
154
See supra notes 110, 116, 127 and accompanying text.
155
PERRY, supra note 2, at 113.
156
See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
157
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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In like manner, consider Contemporary Perry’s discussion of the human
right to religious and moral freedom and its implications for analogous
constitutional claims. As Perry explains, this right permits a person to live out
“core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments,”158 whether or not religious
in nature. This human right is conditional, not absolute.159 It can be overcome in
certain circumstances by legitimate governmental interests, including interests
grounded in “public morals,” but not, according to Perry, interests grounded in
“sectarian morals,” which reflect moral understandings (religious or
nonreligious) that are “widely contested, and in that sense sectarian, among the
citizens of . . . a [contemporary, pluralistic] democracy.”160 Whether the human
right to religious and moral freedom has been violated thus turns, in part, on
whether the beliefs in question are “core or meaning-giving”161 and, if so,
whether the government’s competing interests are grounded in “sectarian” as
opposed to “public” morality.162 In some instances, of course, the proper answers
to these questions might be unclear—that is, the political morality of human
rights might be vague or “underdeterminate.”163 Line-drawing issues and
underdeterminate norms are hardly unique to Perry’s theory of judicial review.
But they do open the door to greater judicial creativity and discretion than might
otherwise be apparent because the Supreme Court, in deciding whether a claim
of constitutional right falls under the General Principle or the Exception, must
first decide whether the claim falls within the political morality of human
rights.164 This critical preliminary judgment is rendered independently, untempered by Thayerian deference, and it includes potentially controversial
assessments of the scope and nature of the relevant human right.

158

PERRY, supra note 2, at 68 (quoting MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 12–13).
Id. at 69.
160
Id. at 74–79.
161
See supra note 158 and accompanying text. In part because the right to religious and moral freedom is
only conditional, Perry urges “[a] generous application of the right,” according to which “the benefit of the doubt
is resolved in favor of the conclusion that the choice at issue is protected by the right.” PERRY, supra note 2, at
69; see id. at 69–70 (explaining that the right to religious and moral freedom is conditional in the sense that the
government may restrict it if the restriction serves a legitimate government objective, is the least burdensome
alternative, and is proportionate to the government objective).
162
PERRY, supra note 2, at 75. For Perry, this distinction prevents the government from advancing a
morality-based objection to same-sex sexual conduct, because such an objection should be seen as sectarian, but
it permits the government to protect human life, including unborn human life, because the governmental interest
in that setting is based on public as opposed to sectarian morality (combined with biological knowledge). See id.
at 147–51, 160–61 (hypothetical judicial opinions); Perry, supra note 102, at 1634, 1643–47.
163
As Perry explains, “[a] right is underdeterminate in a particular context to the extent that in that context
there is room for a reasonable difference in judgments as to whether government has violated the right.” PERRY,
supra note 2, at 171–72 (emphasis omitted).
164
Id. at 113.
159
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Turning to a more specific context, similar issues arise in Contemporary
Perry’s treatment of the constitutional right to same-sex marriage, as recognized
in Obergefell v. Hodges.165 Perry endorses the Supreme Court’s decision, but his
reasoning differs from the Court’s. Discussing the constitutional implications of
both the human right to moral equality and the human right to religious and
moral freedom, Perry reaches two conclusions: (1) the Court’s ruling cannot be
justified under equal protection, but (2) it is justified under the constitutional
right of privacy.166 Each conclusion presents theoretical difficulties.
Perry explains that the constitutional right to equal protection, at its core,
embodies the human right to moral equality, which precludes discriminatory
lawmaking based on the demeaning view that certain human beings, such as
gays and lesbians, are morally inferior.167 Perry contends, however, that “it is
highly questionable whether in the contemporary United States, the view that
gays and lesbians are morally inferior is a ‘but for’ predicate” for their exclusion
from marriage.168 Instead, he concludes that “the dominant and sufficient
rationale” for many or most supporters of the exclusion is that “[s]ame-sex
sexual conduct is immoral.”169 But Perry’s elaboration of the human right to
moral equality, as we have seen, extends the protection of this right to
unintentional and unconscious mistreatment based on selective sympathy and
indifference, an extension leading Perry to endorse, as a matter of constitutional
law, a disparate impact approach to equal protection.170 Earlier I suggested that
this extension of the human right is contentious, as is the argument for a
disparate impact approach to constitutional equal protection. Assuming Perry’s
arguments on those points are sound, however, it is difficult to understand—at
least without further explanation—why they would not support an equal
protection argument favoring same-sex marriage.171
Moving on, Perry rests his support for Obergefell on the right of privacy.
Perry argues that this claimed constitutional right falls within the scope of the

165

576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
PERRY, supra note 2 at 138, 142.
167
See id. at 138 (hypothetical judicial opinion).
168
Id. at 140.
169
Id.; see id. at 140–42; Perry, supra note 102, at 1638–42.
170
See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
171
Cf. PERRY, supra note 2, at 158 (hypothetical judicial opinion arguing that the strict Texas abortion law
invalidated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), violated equal protection as “a law based on sex-selective
sympathy and indifference—the failure to extend to women the same recognition of humanity, and hence the
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to men”); see id. at 157–59; Perry, supra note 102, at 1630–
32.
166
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human right to religious and moral freedom.172 It is for the Supreme Court to
decide, in the exercise of independent judicial judgment, whether this argument
is persuasive. But let us assume that the Court properly would agree. If so, then,
according to Perry’s theory of judicial review, the Court should invoke the
Exception, meaning deference to the claim of constitutional right. Thus, the
Court should recognize the constitutional right—here, a claimed right of privacy
that extends to same-sex marriage—if there is a reasonable argument that the
right is supported either by originalism or by constitutional bedrock. But the
question remains: is either alternative reasonable in this context?
The right of privacy, of course, protects rights that are not enumerated in the
Constitution, and Perry concedes that “no constitutional enactors entrenched
such a right in the constitutional law of the United States,”173 rendering an
originalist argument implausible and therefore unreasonable. Instead, he argues
that the right of privacy is reasonably regarded as constitutional bedrock.174 In
reality, however, the right of privacy has been and remains deeply contested,
certainly as extended beyond traditional rights. The problem lies in the level of
generality at which the claim of right is assessed. It may well be bedrock, or so
one reasonably could conclude, that the right of privacy protects rights that “are,
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’”175 including,
for instance, parental rights176 and the right to conventional, opposite-sex
marriage.177 But it is extremely difficult, and seemingly unreasonable, to argue
that bedrock status goes any further. In other words, it seems unreasonable to
conclude that the right of privacy, as a matter of well-settled and embedded
constitutional doctrine, protects rights that are neither enumerated in the
Constitution nor grounded in longstanding tradition—such as a claimed right to

172
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 145 (hypothetical judicial opinion); id. at 152 (commentary on hypothetical
judicial opinion). In a follow-up article published after his book, Perry contends that the right of privacy is
implicated when gays and lesbians are denied the benefits of marriage because the right “includes not only
freedom from government action punishing one for making a particular choice in exercising one’s moral
freedom, but also freedom from government action withholding benefits bestowed on others who make a
different choice in exercising their moral freedom.” Perry, supra note 102, at 1643.
173
PERRY, supra note 2, at 152 (italicization omitted) (commentary on hypothetical judicial opinion);
Perry, supra note 102, at 1627 n.93.
174
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 142 (hypothetical judicial opinion); id. at 152 (commentary on hypothetical
judicial opinion).
175
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
176
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925).
177
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (declaring that “the right to marry is part of the
fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”).
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physician-assisted suicide,178 for example, or, as argued here, an asserted right
to same-sex marriage.179
In a follow-up article published after his book, Contemporary Perry shifts
ground, offering a two-part constitutional argument for attaching the right of
privacy to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and for extending
the Clause’s protection of religious free exercise to nonreligious moral
choices.180 First, he claims that there is a reasonable originalist argument for
rejecting the approach of Employment Division v. Smith181 and for concluding,
instead, that the right to free exercise “is a broad right that protects against any
government action that, without adequate justification, impedes one’s ability to
live one’s life in accord with one’s religious convictions and commitments.”182
Second, he argues that it is reasonable to accord constitutional bedrock status to
the principle that “the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion covers
moral choices rooted in and nourished by one or another nontheistic worldview
as well as those rooted in and nourished by one or another theistic worldview.”183
This argument is creative, but the Supreme Court has never linked its right of
privacy cases to the Free Exercise Clause, much less developed a wellestablished constitutional doctrine along the lines that Perry proposes. In any
event, the second part of Perry’s argument seems tendentious.184 Yes, the Court

178
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court rejected a right of privacy challenge to a law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, finding that the outlawed practice lacked deeply rooted historical support
and therefore did not warrant presumptive constitutional protection. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–28. Perry,
by contrast, concludes that the right of privacy indeed was implicated in Glucksberg, although he would have
upheld the law nonetheless by finding that it reasonably could be said to satisfy strict scrutiny. See PERRY, supra
note 2, at 153–56 (hypothetical judicial opinion).
179
What about the right to choose abortion? Perry argues that abortion decisionmaking warranted
presumptive constitutional protection in 1973, as part of the right of privacy, when the Supreme Court decided
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See PERRY, supra note 2, at 159–64 (hypothetical judicial opinion invoking
strict scrutiny but upholding some abortion regulations as reasonably satisfying this test). But the right to choose
abortion was not a deeply rooted traditional right in 1973, making Perry’s argument contentious. Nonetheless,
despite repeated challenges to Roe and significant doctrinal modifications, by now there has been presumptive
constitutional protection for pre-viability abortion decisionmaking for nearly half a century. See FELDMAN &
SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 526–46 (discussing Roe and subsequent abortion cases). The long duration of this
specific precedent, in itself, makes it at least reasonable today to accord bedrock status to the right to choose
abortion prior to fetal viability—entirely apart from Perry’s retrospective argument about 1973. (Whether the
current Supreme Court will adhere to this precedent is a different question, one that the Court is considering in
a pending case. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021), granting cert. to 945 F.3d
265, 273 (5th Cir. 2019).
180
See Perry, supra note 102, at 1628–29.
181
494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
182
Perry, supra note 102, at 1628.
183
Id. at 1628–29.
184
The first part of Perry’s argument, standing alone, cannot justify an extension of free exercise rights to
nonreligious moral choices.
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sometimes has suggested that free exercise extends to deeply held moral
beliefs.185 But it has never adopted this view in a clear constitutional ruling. And
it sometimes has suggested, to the contrary, that the right is limited to beliefs
that are theistic or otherwise religious in a conventional sense.186 According to
the latter view, free exercise does not protect moral choices that are “purely
secular”—that is, choices that are “philosophical and personal rather than
religious.”187 The former view, which would extend free exercise to a broader
range of deeply held moral beliefs, may make good sense, but it seems
unreasonable to argue that such a doctrine is already in place and, indeed, that
the doctrine is so clearly settled as to qualify as constitutional bedrock.
3. An Overall Assessment of Contemporary Perry’s Theory
I do not mean to exaggerate the problems I have identified in Perry’s
elaborations and applications of his theoretical model. As Perry notes, judges do
not always agree in their evaluation of particular claims, not even when the issue
is whether a claim is reasonable.188 And even if some elaborations and
applications of Perry’s model may be unjustified, that might mean only that he
should revise those elaborations and applications, not that he should jettison his
general theory. Even so, my discussion suggests that Perry’s theory may leave
room for a troublesome degree of judicial creativity and discretion—in making
independent judicial judgments about the nature and scope of human rights and
about whether they should be understood to encompass constitutional claims; in
determining whether originalist and bedrock arguments are reasonable or
unreasonable; and in defining the level of generality at which human rights and
constitutional claims should be conceptualized. Compounding these difficulties
is Perry’s reliance, in part, on hypothetical judicial opinions from a fictional
jurist who is “not always explicit” in explaining how Perry’s theory leads to the
positions that she adopts.189
The issues that I have highlighted relate mainly to my criterion of judicial
objectivity and competence. That criterion calls for principled and consistent
judicial decisionmaking based on objectively determined values. The
elaborations and applications that I have discussed, by contrast, suggest that
Perry’s theory opens the door to judicial decisionmaking that is insufficiently
cabined by norms drawn from external sources and that therefore permits a
185
186
187
188
189

See DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 61–64 (2016).
See id. at 64–66. Buddhism, for example, is essentially non-theistic, but it plainly qualifies as religious.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972).
See PERRY, supra note 2, at 107.
Id. at 120.
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relatively aggressive form of judicial review. To the extent that this is so, the
theory also falters, in like degree, under the criterion of majoritarian selfgovernment, because the zone of majority rule shrinks as the realm of judicial
policymaking expands.
In summary, under my three criteria, Contemporary Perry’s theory of
judicial review is attractive in the abstract. Perry’s elaborations and applications
of his theory raise difficulties, but the theory overall remains strong, certainly as
compared to the theory of Early Perry. Contemporary Perry offers a forceful and
appealing functional justification for judicial review: bringing American
constitutional law into greater harmony with the political morality of human
rights. And, with the caveats I have noted, his theory honors to a significant
degree the need for judicial objectivity and competence and the importance of
majoritarian self-government.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Employing three criteria—(1) majoritarian self-government, (2) judicial
objectivity and competence, and (3) functional justification—I have analyzed
and evaluated two theoretical models of judicial review in individual rights
cases, each proposed by Professor Michael J. Perry, albeit in books separated by
three and a half decades. As I have explained, Early Perry’s justification for his
approach, the judicial advancement of political-moral truth, was extraordinarily
powerful. But his theory was unpersuasive because it called for a
decisionmaking methodology that undermined judicial objectivity, fell well
outside the competence of the Supreme Court, and was fundamentally
inconsistent with the principle of majoritarian self-government. Contemporary
Perry’s theory is far more attractive. Despite the weaknesses and difficulties that
I have identified, this theory respects, to a substantial extent, the need for judicial
objectivity and competence and the importance of majoritarian self-government.
At the same time, it offers a strong functional justification for the model of
judicial decisionmaking that it endorses. Although judicial review in accordance
with this model might not advance political-moral truth, at least not directly, it
would move American constitutional law into closer alignment with the global
political morality of human rights, a morality that Contemporary Perry has
persuasively elaborated and forcefully defended.
Having summarized my principal conclusions, I turn briefly to two final sets
of observations. The first addresses Professor Perry’s transformation from Early
Perry to Contemporary Perry, and the second raises a question for future
consideration.
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First, to state the obvious, Professor Perry’s thinking has changed
dramatically over time. Early Perry advocated passionately and eloquently for a
prophetic and activist Supreme Court that would propel the advancement of
human rights through nonoriginalist decisions based on the Justices’ own values.
Contemporary Perry is far more cautious, embracing a backward-looking
approach to constitutional interpretation that relies on originalism combined
with a narrow understanding of bedrock precedent. Even so, Contemporary
Perry is still promoting the advancement of human rights—now understood as
the product of a worldwide political-moral consensus—by adjusting his model
of judicial review to include a presumption favoring the recognition of
constitutional rights that fall within the global political morality of human rights.
Influenced by the rising tide of originalism in constitutional interpretation,
Contemporary Perry is older and wiser, if perhaps less conspicuously passionate
than his earlier self. As I have explained, however, some of Contemporary
Perry’s rights-promoting elaborations and applications of his complex approach
are contentious, suggesting that Contemporary Perry, at heart, is not as far from
Early Perry as their competing theories might suggest.
Second, I wonder whether an explicitly forward-looking theory of judicial
review, if properly designed, might permit an openly progressive understanding
of constitutional rights without falling prey to the weaknesses of Early Perry’s
theory. In my own work, I have proposed such a theory, arguing that the
Supreme Court, at least in certain contexts, properly can draw nonoriginalist
constitutional norms from evolving American values, thus protecting rights that
have grown to reflect a general or emerging national consensus.190 This theory
fares well under my criteria of evaluation. Evolving American values can fairly
be described as majoritarian, and they can be objectively discerned in patterns
of social and legal change, including lawmaking in the various states. Moreover,
judicial review in accordance with this theory would serve several interrelated
functions: nationalizing rights that most but not all states have embraced;
enhancing liberty to a significant degree; and advancing political-moral progress
in the United States. Or so I have argued.191 But my focus on American values
seems too narrow, discounting as it does the global political morality that
Contemporary Perry so ably identifies and defends. Could a theory of evolving

190
I have elaborated the theory in the context of substantive due process (i.e., right of privacy cases). See
Conkle, supra note 9, at 128–33. But evolving American values properly can inform equal protection as well,
adding important support, for example, to the substantive due process argument for a right to same-sex marriage.
See Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27, 28, 34 (2014).
191
See Conkle, supra note 9, at 133–45.
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American values be combined or intertwined with a theory promoting the global
political morality of human rights? I leave that question to future exploration.

